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Christopher Jacob Reiss
School of Psychology
Florida Institute of Technology

Abstract

Title:

Locus-of-Control in an Interactionist Approach
to Behavior
Major Advisor: Charles D. Corman, Ph.D., Dean
School of Psychology
The impetus for this empirical study is: 1) to provide

further construct validity for the I-E scale; and 2) to
advance the locus-of-control construct as an important concept
in the growing theoretical model of interactionism.

The main

models in personality psychology are compared and contrasted
with interactionism.

2

The literature on locus-of-control, implicating
its importance for understanding the interactionist
perspective, is reviewed.

Because anxiety and anagram

tasks are utilized as person and situation variables
in the present study they also are reviewed prior to
stating specific hypotheses.
The major hypotheses are: 1) that the state anxiety
of subjects with scores on the internal side of the
continuum of the Rotter I-E Scale is significantly
related to their internal characteristic of trait anxiety;
and 2) that the state anxiety of subjects with scores
on the external side of the continuum of the Rotter I-E
Scale, is significantly related to the external situation
involving different anagram tasks.

A repeated measures

design was employed, which assessed subjects' state
anxiety under both easy and difficult anagram situations.
The data were analyzed by way of a repeated measures
analysis of variance.
Results demonstrated that internal subjects' state
anxiety was significantly related to trait anxiety,
anagram tasks, and their interaction.

External subjects'

state anxiety was significantly related to anagram tasks.
It is concluded that the internal locus-of-control
construct should be accommodated to account for these

3

results.

Henceforth, an individual's perception that

outcome is only partially contingent upon his own control
will be termed a belief in internal control.

Conversely,

an individual's perception that outcome is totally noncontingent upon himself, will be termed a belief in
external control.
It is further concluded that the situationist
model may be useful in understanding external individual's
determinants of behavior.

However, the interactionist

model may be useful in understanding internal individual's
determinants of behavior, in particular, and the ontogenetics of both internals and externals, in general.
Although the psychodynamic model has promise and much
in common with interactionism, it does not seem as
pragmatic nor as amenable to empirical study.
model seems of little utility.

The trait

Finally, implications

for clinical practice and future research are outlined.
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Introduction

I.

General Classification: of Personality Theories
In order to effectively deal with core issues,
it is often useful to categorize numerous personality
theories into a few global models which can be compared
and contrasted across a number of parameters.

Endler

and Magnusson (1976) distinguished four main models in
personality psychology:

1) the trait model; 2) the psy-

chodynamic model, with its roots in psychoanalysis; 3)
the situationism model, with its roots in behaviorism;
and 4) the interactionism model. 1

Then they identified

seven fundamental dimensions to discern these models.
A schematic comparison is presented in Table 1 of this
manuscript.
A.

Determinants of Behavior
The first distinguishing parameter involves the

different hypothesized determinants of actual behavior.

1. Endler and Magnusson (1976) noted that a fifth
model, phenomenologywas initiated by Husserl. However,
since the basic aim of the discussion is to depict the
theoretical controversies which led to the formulation
of the interactionist model, no further discussion of
phenomenology is presented. For a survey of phenomenolo. gical theories, the reader is referred to Mischel (1971).

8

As noted by Endler and Magnusson (1976), a precursor of
the trait model was the typology perspective which assumed
discrete categories of personality.

Both regard behavior

as determined by latent, stable dispositions within the
person, i.e. , B = f(P). The trait model assumes that the
prime determinants of behavior are various continuous
dimensions with individual differences on each.

Although

not considered as such by Endler and Magnusson (1976),
Freud's (1940) structural theory is basically interactional
in nature.

For psychoanalysis, behavior is viewed as

resulting from a compromise formation between the id, ego,
super-ego, and reality.

Thus, the factors determining

behavior are not only within the person.
Situationism regards situational factors as the
main determiants, i.e., B = . f(S).

Thorndike (1898) pre-

sented this view when proposing the Law of Effect.
According to interactionism, actual behavior is
the result of an indispensible, continuous interaction
between the person and the situations he encounters, i.e.,
B

= F(P,S).

This implies that the individual's behavior

is influenced by significant features of the situation,
but furthermore the individual chooses the situations in
which he performs and selects significant situational
aspects which then serve as cues for his activities in
in these situations.
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Bowers (1973), an interactionist, denies the primacy
of either persons or situations in the determination of
behavior.

Instead, he argues that situations are as

much a function of the person as the person's behavior
is a function of the situation.

Hence, man can create

the circumstances which sustain him.

As pointed out

by Bowers (1973) , there are also more subtle ways in
which situations are functions of persons.

These will

be elaborated below in a discussion of the developmental
aspects of behavior.
B.

Onotgenetics
The second distinguishing parameter cited by Endler

and Magnusson (1976) is concerned with how an individual's
reaction pattern is determined ontogenetically.

The trait

and psychodynamic models differ with respect to the
emphasis they place on development.

The former regards

traits as · stable dispositions, which are effected to some
degree by maturation, but not primarily by environmental
factors.

The latter regards individual differences in

adult behavior as a function of both genic and experiential determinants.

For situationism, the actual response

pattern is determined by social learning processes, and
ult~mately

the result of situational factors.

attention is paid to inherited factors.

Little

For interactionism,
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development involves a social learning process that also
emphasizes organismic differences and the way a person
selects and influences the situations he interacts with.
In this respect, interactionisrn is closer to the psychodynamic model than the trait or situationist models.
The major problem with this nature-nurture issue is
that it is almost impossible to control for whether a child
comes into the world genetically predisposed, or as a blank
slate to be filled in by experience.

Escalona (1968) holds

that organismic differences exist at the very beginning,
before objective differences in the situation can have any
part in creating them.

For interactionism, the organism's

experience must be specified in terms of the particular
situation it experiences right from the outset.
According to Piaget's genetic epistemology, as
presented by Flavell (1963), the cognitive organism is
at all levels of development a very active agent who
always meets the environment well over halfway.

He

actually constructs his world by assimilating it to schemas, while accommodating these schemes to its constraints.
A truly penetrating accommodation to reality (i.e., being
truly "realistic" about reality) is simply not possible
without an assimilatory framework which tells the organism
where to look, and how to organize that which it finds.
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As noted by Bowers (1973), reality virtually exists
for a person as a function of his means and methods for
knowing it.

The situation is a function of the observer

in the subtle sense that the observer's cognitive schemas
filter and organize the environment in a fashion that
is impossible to ever completely separate the environment
from the person observing it.

Mischel et al.

(1972)

demonstrated that when children perform cognitive transformations on reward objects so that they have a less
desirable image in their mind, they can delay gratification
longer.
Some evidence suggests that people can foster
consistent social environments--which in turn reciprocate
by fostering their development.

For example Raush (1965)

found that aggressive, as distinguished from normal, children
can be categorized by the fact that they foster aggressiveengendering situations to which they respond aggressively.

c.

Measurement and Research Strategies
Before discussing the third parameter it is essential

to briefly outline a few conceptual distinctions.

Magnusson

and Endler (1977) noted that a theory of personality is
a consistent set of interrelated, hypothetical, intervening
variables (i.e., mediating variables) that are used to
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describe, explain and predict actual behavior.

Different

personality models stress different kinds of intervening
or hypothetical variables as the important ones in the
mediating process.

These mediating variables are assumed

to underlie and determine actual behavior.

Magnusson

and Endler (1977) classified them in terms of: 1) structural
variables (i.e., the characteristic properties of the
mediating system, such as intelligence and cognitive
complexity); 2) content variables (i.e., situationally
determined or stored information, such as the content
of anxiety arousing situations); and 3) motivational
variables (i.e., the arousing, directing and maintaining
forces of the process, such as values, drives, needs
and motives) .
Magnusson and Endler (1977) contrasted these mediation variables with reaction variables.

The later can

be classified in terms of: 1) overt behavior; 2) covert
behavior; 3) physiological reactions; and 4) "artificial"
behavior (i.e., "test" behavior and other reactions to
artificial situations constructed to elicit individual
differences in behavior for a specified variable) .

In

order to distinguish between these react i on variables
and the methods used to collect data that are presumably
an expression of these variables, please refer to Table 2.
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Magnusson (1974) has pointed to the important
distinction between personality theories and their models
of measurement.

Magnusson and Endler (1977) explored

the latter which assumes a relationship between the responses
that are usually expressed by the data that we collect, and
the mediating variables of the personality theory.

The

meas.urement model operationali zes, by actual measurement,
the mediating variables under investigation and describes
the relationship between mediating variables and reactions.
1.

Trait Model
Magnusson (1974) outlined two basic assumptions

of the trait measurement model.

First, there is a true

score for each individual on a quantifiable dimension
for every personality trait, and second, latent positions
of each personality dimension have a monotonic, linear
relationship with their positions on reaction scales
(e.g., homogeneous personality tests), which are operationalized measures of the traits.

Hence, the trait

measurement model predicts that there are stable rank
orders of individuals across situtions with respect to
positions on reaction scales.

Research bearing on this

prediction will be presented below in a critique o f personality theories.
With respect to data treatment, Magnusson and
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Endler (1977) indicated that the trait measurement model
is the basis for the use of linear regression procedures,
such as correlation and factor analyses.
As summarized by Bowers (1973), the classical
trait view: 1) employs correlational techniques; 2) sugges.ts
that an individual's behavior should be relatively constant
from one situation to the next; and 3) suggests that in
the same situation individual differences should emerge.
Thus the trait model provides for trans-situational similarity of behavior within persons, and for subjective
differences in behavior within situations.

Trans-situational

variation is clearly an embarrassment to trait theory.
2.

Psychodynamic Model
A basic difference between the trait and psy-

chodynamic measurement models has been illustrated by
Magnusson (1974).

The latter does not assume a monotonic,

linear relationship between an individual's manifest
behaviors and the underlying intrapsychic processes.
Figure 1 shows the difference between the two measurement
models for a specific example.

Note that the curvilinear,

nonmonotonic function for the psychodynamic measurement
model is based on the assumption that up to a certain
level the reaction variable increases with the increasing
mediating variable under investigation.

However, after
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a certain level, the defense mechanisms start to inhibit
the expression of the mediating variable.

Therefore,

linear regression procedures may not always be appropriate for treatment of data generated by the psychodynamic
measurement model.
3.

Situationism Model
According to Endler and Magnusson (1976),

situationism has relied on the classical procedures of
experimental psychology.

The most frequently used method

for data collection has been response counts, and the
most common method for data treatment has been analysis
of variance.
are predicted.

Main effects due to situational factors
Theorists from the interactionist model

expended the greatest effort in dimensionalizing, defining
and determining the nature of situations.

As a result,

I will present that literature later as a subdivision
of an overall examination of the interactionist model.
As summarized by Bowers (1973), situationism:
1) tends to employ experimental or operant techniques;
2) suggests that an individual's behavior should change
from one situation to another; and 3) regards individual
differences within the same situation as awkward, and
to be conceptualized as the result of past experience
or simply as error variance.

Thus, the situationist
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model provides for trans-situational differences in behavior within subjects and minimal subject variance within
situations.
4.

Interactionism Model
The appropriate methods for data collection

within the context of an interactionist model should
analyze information in the multidimensional patterns
of reactions across situations for individuals.

In ref-

erence to this, Endler and Magnusson (1976) called for
new statistical methods but few have been developed.
More on this issue will be presented below.

II.

Empirically Based Critique of Personality Theories
A major problem in the debate on personality theories
is the consistency issue.

Magnusson (1976a,b) indicated

that to an extent it is a level of analysis problem.
One important distinction is between consistency at the
mediating level and consistency at the reaction level.
It can not be assumed that there is a one-to-one relationship between consistency at these two different levels.
Thus, findings of consistency or inconsistency at one
level may have little to say about another level, unless
lawfully specified.

17

A.

Consistency of Behavior Systems
Magnusson (1974, 1976a, b) distinguished three

meanings for consistency of reaction variables: 1) absolute
consistency; 2) relative consistency; and 3) coherence.
The first is when an individual's behavior occurs to the
same extent across situations.

The second is when an

individual's behavioral rank order in a population is
stable across situations. Coherence is when an individual's
pattern of stable and changing behavior across situations
is characteristic for him and may be interpreted in a
meaningful way within the interactional model.

Hence,

behavior can be predictable without necessarily being
stable in either absolute or relative terms.
Traditionally, research has focused on absolute
and relative consistency.

As noted by Magnusson and Endler

(1977), both can be studied with respect to similar and
dissimilar situations.

Please refer to Table 3.

Relative consistency across similar situations
(i.e., Cell A in Table 3) has been substantiated in numerous studies on test-retest reliability.

For example,

Magnusson, Gerzen and Nyman (1968) obtained correlations
ranging from .64 to .76 for both overt and artificial
behaviors, and Patkai (1970) found strong correlations
for physiological reactions.

Magnusson, Duner and
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Zetterblom (1975) came to the same conclusion for testretest measures of covert reactions, and "test behavior."
Magnusson et al.

(1975) also presented support for relative

consistency of people across similar situations, ontogenetically over time.
Absolute consistency across similar situations
(i.e., Cell Bin Table 3) has also been substantiated.
Most of the research in this area has been concerned
with "test behavior," such as Fiske's (1961) study of
intraindividual variability.

Magnusson (1976) also

reported high cross-situational consistency for physiological reactions.
Relative consistency across dissimilar situations
(i.e., Cell C in Table 3) has not been as impressive.
A classic study using the correlational approach, was
conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928).

Their study did

not support the theoretical assumptions of the trait
model.

Magnusson, Heffler and Nyman (1968) also failed

to find any cross-situational stability using the same
approach.
A second method used in this area is to factor
analyze a set of intercorrelations between different
situational measures of the same main dependent variable.
Most of the total variance should be explained by one
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factor if the trait hypothesis is valid. However, Sakoda
(1952), Burton (1963) and Nelsen et al.

(1969) all found

more than one factor in their studies.
A third method for testing relative consistency
across dissimilar situations, is to investigate separate
quantitative contributions of persons and situations
as well as variance accounted for by their interaction.
Bowers (1973) has reviewed the empirical evidence in
this domain.

Please refer to Table 4.

As observed by

Bowers (1973), the data clearly indicated that far too
little of the total variance (i.e.,

x=

12.71%)was due

to the person to justify a thoroughgoing trait position.
On the other hand, the percentage of variance due to
situations was also meager (i.e.,

x

= 10.17%).

In fact,

in eleven out of nineteen comparisons, the percentage
of variance due to situations was less than the amount
of variance due to persons.

Furthermore, the interac-

tion of persons and situations accounted for a higher
percentage of variance than either main effect in fourteen
of eighteen possible comparisons, and in eight out of
eighteen comparisons the interaction term accounted for
more variance than the sum of the main effects.

The

mean percentage attributed to the Person X Situation
interaction was 20.77%.
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These results were based on studies of social
behavior and noncognitive personality variables.

However,

Mischel (1968, 1969 , 1973) summarizes some evidence which
supports stability over time and trans-situational consistency with respect to intellectual and cognitive
variables.

Shapiro (1965) indicated that some personality

variables bearing on affinity to "cognitive style," like
impulsiveness, may also belong to this latter group of
variables.
Magnusson and Endler (1977) emphasized how behavior
can be consistent in the sense of being coheLant (i.e.,
lawful and inherently predictable) without being stable
in eitherofthe forms discussed above.
this point with a concrete example.
Figure 2.

They illustrated
Please refer to

The state anxiety profiles for two individuals

across six situations are presented.

Situations 1 and 4

are assumed to be neutral with regard to anxiety, 2 and
3 evoke physical threat, and 5 and 6 evoke ego threat.
Thus, it is conceivable that individuals with the same
mean level of state anxiety across situations (i.e.,
the same trait disposition) may differ in a systematic
predictable way in their pattern of state anxiety reactions.
The coherence of behavior, in the sense described above,
has rarely been empirically explored.
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B.

Consistency of Mediating Systems
Magnusson and Endler (1977) suggested that con-

sistency of the mediating process means that an individual
selects, interprets and treats situational information
in the frame of reference provided by previously stored
information in a consistent manner.

As mentioned above,

mediating variables can be classified in terms of: 1)
structure; 2) content; or 3) motivation.

Mischel (1968,

1969) has presented support for the consistency of structural variables.

Magnusson (1975, 1976a, b) concluded

that in terms of information processing the mediation system
is consistent and coherent in the manner in which it
selects and processes various content and motivational
variables, but the actual manifestation of the content
and motivational factors differs from situation to situation.

III.

Overall Examination of the Interactionism Model
What has been called trait theory and situationism
in earlier discussions are not unified theories about
which all trait theorists and situationists would agree.
Although these accounts began at opposite ends of a continuum, to some extent they have both shifted towards
an interactionist position in the center.

This is evident
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when one makes note of the situationally based moderating
variables which "contemporary trait

theorists," such

as Cattell (1965) and Stagner (1974), have introduced.
Mischel (1973) moved from his earlier situationistic
view into social behavior theory. 2

Global distinctions

between theories have become blurred.

However, differences

in emphasis and content emerge when closely examining
the specific formulations of numerous interactionists.
Such an endeavor would be beyond the scope of this documented report.

What follows is an overview of interactionism

in general.
A.

Early Theoretical Foundations
Shute (1973) has indicated that Aristotle was

one of the first to formulate an interactionist view
of behavior.

More recently, Lewin (1935, 1936, 1938,

1951) presented an interactionistic viewpoint which has
influenced many later theorists.

His field theory stressed

the interaction between personality and a meaningful

2. Mischel's (1975) cognitive social learning
person variables are summarized in Table 5. People may
differ in their capabilities to perform response patterns,
in how they categorize situations and construe themselves,
in their behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome expectancies, in their subjective values attached to outcomes
in a situation, and in their self-regulating systems
and plans that they bring to a situation; all of which
has an effect on their subsequent behavior.
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environment, that is B

=

f(P,E), and maintained the indis-

pensable interdependency of personal and situational
factors in eliciting behavior.

According to Lewin, the

individual is part of the situation.

Endler and Magnusson

(1976) indicated that his formulation actually foreshadowed the main elements of modern interactionism.
Murray's (1938) need-press theory stressed that
the unit of analysis in personality research is considered
to be the organism-environment interaction, rather than
either variable per se.

Tolman (1951) formulated behavior

as a function of environmental stimuli, heredity, post
training, and physiology; that is B

=

f(S,H,T,P).

Sullivan's

(1953) discussion of interpersonal relations belongs to
the interactionist tradition, and Rotter (1954) emphasized
the interactionist position in his social learning approach
to personality.

Rotter's formulations will be discussed

in greater detail below.
B.

Contemporary Theoretical Developments
Endler and Magnusson (1976) indicated that concurrent

with the first empirical studies on person by situation
interaction, "modern" formulations of interactionism began
to appear.

As cited above, Mischel (1973) moved to a clear

interactionist position.

Sherif and Sherif (1969) in
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in their discussion of social interaction, Carson (1969)
in his development of Sullivan's interpersonal theory,
Jones and Nisbett (1971), and Schneider (1973) in their
reviews of the literature on person perception, all
operate within an interactionist framework.
Magnusson and Endler (1977) conceptualized contemporary formulations of interactional psychology by
summarizing four main points: l) actual behavior is a
function of a continuous process of multidirectional
interaction or feedback between the individual and the
situations he encounters; 2) the individual is an intentional, active agent in this interaction process; 3)
on the person side of the interaction, cognitive and
motivational factors are essential determinants of behavior; and 4) on the situation side, the psychological
meaning of situations for the individual is the important
determining factor.
l.

Continuous Process of Interaction
Magnusson and Endler (1977) described two

different uses of the term interaction: l) in the statistical sense of the word, reflecting interactions of main
factors within a data matrix; and 2) in a model of behavior,
integrating person mediating variables, person reaction
variables and situational variables.

The former is
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mechanistic and the latter is dynamic.
a.

Mechanistic Interaction
In reference to reaction variables

Magnusson and Endler (1977) presented four different
subcategories of mechanistic interactions: 1) individuals by modes of response; 2) individuals by situations;
3) situations by modes of response; and 4) individuals
by modes of response by situations.

The analysis of

variance approach has shown the existence of strong
interactions of these sort.
b.

Dynamic Interaction
Two subcategories of dynamic interactions,

with reference to different kinds of situational influences,
were also presented by Magnusson and Endler (1977): 1)
within-situation interaction; and 2) between-situation
interaction.

Note that the dynamic model does not assume

unidirectional causality.
reciprocal causality.

Instead it is based on

Little has been done to develop

new approaches for treatment of data which would empirically examine the bidirectional nature of dynamic
interaction.

However, Raush (1972) has made a step

forward with a Markov approach. 3

3. For a further understanding of the Markov
approach for studying continuous interactional processes, please refer to Raush (1972).
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2.

Intentional and Active Aspects of the Individual
Tolman (1951) implied that behavior is pur-

posive.

Bowers (1973), Mischel (1973), and Stagner (1973)

indicated that to some extent an individual selects his
situational encounters and effects the character of
situations.
3.

Cognitive and Motivational Factors
In light of the above, Endler and Magnusson

(1976) concluded that cognitive and motivational factors
were obvious determinants of behavior.
emphasized the importance of cognition..

Tolman (1949)
Please refer

again to Table 5 for a summary of Mischel's (1973) five
cognitive variables.

Fielder

(1972) stressed the im-

portance of motivational variables.
4.

Psychological Meaning of Situations
Magnusson (1976a) discussed the two main approaches

for the analyses of situations.

The first was characterized

by the investigation of objective (i.e., physical and
social) situational properties.

The second was character-

ized by the investigation of subjective situational
properties.

Magnusson and Endler (1977) grouped these

later properties into three main categories: 1) perception;
2) motivation; and 3) reaction.
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a.

Objective Situational Properties
As described by Magnusson, Duner and

Zetterblom (1975), the physical environment can be
investigated on the macro-level (e.g., cities, buildings, parks, and etc.) or on the micro-level (i.e.,
in terms of single objects or single stimulus variables) .
They also noted that social environments can be investigated on two levels: 1) the macro-social environment
defined by the norms, values, laws and etc., that are
common to a whole society; and 2) the micro-social
environment defined by the attitudes, habtts, and etc.
of the specific groups whom an individual interacts
with directly.
Tolman (1951) re£erred to physical situations in his equation for studying person by situation
interactions.

Sells (1963) made a preliminary step

towards a taxonomic dimensionalization by outlining
an imposing but manageable system of environmental
variables.
Barker (1965) and Craik (1973) clearly
emphasized the importance of environmental characteristics.

Lazarus

(1971) and Gibson (1960) discussed

physical factors on the macro-level as determinants of
behavior.

28

Sherif and Sherif (1956, 1963, 1969)
have stressed the social aspects of the environment.
Krause (1970) outlined seven dimensions of social behavior settings.

Chein (1954) proposed a schema

concerned with both physical and social situational
characteristics.

The term ecology, as conceptualized

by Brunswik (1952, 1956), refers to the subset of
physical and social environmental factors which an individual encounters and acts upon in his daily life.
Thus,

it~

clear that when referring to the objective

world, researchers differ to the extent.that they
describe situations in terms of physical, social, or
a combination of both factors.
b.

Subjective Situational Properties
Magnusson and Endler (1977) indicated

that situations can be studied with reference to how
they are perceived and interpreted by individuals.
Angyal (1941) , Koffka (1935) , Lewin

(1935) and Murray

(1938) were some of the earlier researchers who stressed
the importance of investigating the meaning of situations.

More recently, Bowers (1973), Endler (1975),

Mischel (1973), Rotter (1954) and Schneider (1973) also
emphasized its importance.
Based on the hypothesis that individuals
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discriminate among situations along cognitive dimension
and that situations can be regarded as related to each
other in a cognitive space, Magnusson (1971) developed
a psychophysical scaling method for studying the perception of situations.

He analyzed situation perception

data for both individuals and groups.
and the results of Ekehammar et al.
et al.

His results,

(1973) and Magnusson

(1973) support the assumption that there are

relatively stable individual differences in the perception of situations.

A new method for study;tng the

meaning of situations was proposed by Pervin (1968) .
He utilized a semantic differential technique.
Magnusson and Endler (1977) indicated
another way of classifying situations (i.e., in terms
of motivational variables) .

This approach was used by

Murray (1938) and Rotter (1954).

Thus, situations can

be studied based on the press they exercise on the
individual or the needs they satisfy.

Empirical research

using this need - press approach has been presented
by Stern, Stein, and Bloom (1956) and by Stern (1970)
in their analyses of work and educational situations.
Classifying situations in terms of the
reactions they e-l icit
(1954).

has been advocated by Rotter

This approach has recently been discussed by
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Frederiksen (1972).

Endler et al.

(1962), and Endler

and Hunt (1968) classified situations by factor analysis
of anxiety and hostility data.

Empirical studies ex-

pressing situational differences in reaction variables
have also been conducted by Sakoda (1952), Levin (1965),
Ekehammar, Magnusson and Ricklander (1974), Schalling
(1971), and Frederiksen, Jensen and Beaton (1972) .
Investigations comparing both the situation
perception approach and the situation reaction approach
in the same study were conducted by Magnusson and Ekehammar
(1975) and Ekehammar, Schalling, and Magnusson (1975).
They found that the two approaches for studying situations
produced essentially the same results with few discrepancies.
Note that situations can differ in a variety
of ways.

Mischel (1973) conceptualized situations on a

continuum from powerful to weak.

Thus, situations can

be powerful to the degree that they: 1) lead all persons
to construe the particular events in the same way; 2)
induce uniform expectancies regarding the most appropriate
response pattern; and 3) instill the skills necessary
for its satisfactory construction and execution.
converse is true of weak situations.

The

31

IV.

Locus-of-Control and Implications for Understanding
Interact1onism
As concluded, increased consideration should be
given to the interaction of persons and situations.
More specifically, the way individuals cognize their
environment needs to be explored.

It is presently

hypothesized that locus-of-control holds considerable
promise for increasing our understanding of interaction ism.
Reid (1977) stated that this concept refers to
the degree to which attribution

_of · causality of

behavior is made either to oneself or to sources external
to oneself.

From the already rather extensive literature

presented below, it appears that behavior is strongly
influenced by the degree to which an individual feels
he is in control of his outcomes or else is being influenced by various aspects of his environment.
According to Rotter (1966), when a reinforcement
is perceived by a subject as following some action of
his own but not being entirely contingent upon his
action, it is typically perceived as under the control
of powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the
great complexity of the forces surrounding him.

When

the event is interpreted in this way by an individual
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it is labeled as a belief in external control.

If a

person perceives that the event is contingent upon his
own behavior or his own relatively permanent characteristics, it is termed as a belief in internal control.
The present study will examine the relationship
between locus-of-control and the amount of variance in
behavior due to either internal characteristics or
external forces.

Thus, I expect that individuals with

an internal locus-of-control will tend to have their
behavior determined to a greater extent by internal
characteristic.

Whereas individuals with an external

locus-of-control will tend to have. their behavior
determined to a greater extent by external situational
forces.

This would provide evidence for further construct

validity of internal and external loo us-of-control,
and advance the theoretical model of interactionism.
Prior to a more detailed description of the
present study it is important to review the theoretical
background and general literature related to locus-ofcontrol.
A.

Theoretical Foundations
According to London and Exner (1978), a major

shortcoming of much empirical research on locus-of-control
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is its lack of theoretical foundation.

Therefore, to

better understand the research and issue-s that will be
described below it is essential to examine social learning theory, the framework from which locus-of-control
developed.
As noted by Rotter (1954) and Rotter, Chance and
Phares (1972), behavior is determined by: 1) the individual's expectancy that the behavior in question will
lead to a reinforcement; and 2) the value of that
reinforcement.

The magnitude of the exceptancy and the

value of the reinforcement are conditioned in part by
the nature of the specific situation to which one is
predicting.

Hence, prediction of behavior involves

three variables: 1) expectancies; 2) reinforcements;
and 3) the psychological situation.
Rotter (1954) emphasized the particular importance
of expectancies in understanding locus-of-control.
Ignoring reinforcements for the moment, an individual's
expectancy in a situation (i.e., E

) is a function of:
S2
1) his expectancies based on previous specific experience
in the same situation (i.e., E' ) ; and 2) his expectancies
Sl

generalized from past situations that he regards as
similar (i.e., GE), divided by the amount of prior
experience in the same situation (i.e., Ns 1 ).

Rotter
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(1954) calculated this relationship as follows:
E 51 = f

(E' 51 , GE/N 51 )

This formula clearly suggested the importance
of general personality factors, but it also suggested
the great importance of specific situational variables
as well.

Accordingly, as specific past experience

increases, the value of generalized experience decreases.
Rotter, Chance and Phares (1972) further delineated
the concept of generalized expectancies into: 1) the
probability of the occurrence of related reinforcements
(i.e. GE) such as a generalized expectancies for goal
attainment; and 2) the generalized expectancies about
how a situation should be usefully construed from the
point of view of problem solving (i.e., GEp 5 ) such
as generalized expectancies involving, locus-of-control,
trust, and many others.

Rotter, Chance and Phares

(1972) reformulated the relationship as follows:
Es

_
1 -

f(E', GEr, GE

, GEP
, . . . , GEps)
52
P5 1
n
F(N )
51

Thus, locus-of-control is only one entry in a
very complex formula for the prediction of behavior.
B.

Research Findings
Reid (1977) noted that in recent years a vast

35

amount of research has been published on such topics
as intrinsic-extrinsic motivation, attribution of
causality, locus-of-control and reaction to aversive
stimuli, and individual differences in internal versus
external locus-of-control. Although this research has
been based on various theoretical models and used quite
divergent methodologies, each topic appears to have
dealt with locus-of-control.

A common theme among these

topics was that the manner in which individuals attribute
causality strongly affects their subsequent behavior.
To illustrate, basic findings from these areas are
described below. 4
1.

Intrinsic-Extrinsic Motivation
Deci (1975) , Kruglanski, Alon and Lewis (1972) ,

Lepper and Greene (1975), and Ross (1975) used a research
paradigm in which they omitted rewards from one group
for doing intrinsically interesting tasks and gave
rewards to another group.

Thosesubjects who received

an external reward showed less intrinsic interest in
later sessions.

Thus, subjects' behavior was sensitive

4. The scope of this report restricts the amount
of detail given to each topic. Consequently, only the most
significant and representative studies will be cited.
However, since individual differences in internal versus
external locus-of-control is of chief concern to the
present study, this topic will be reviewed more extensively.
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to the existence of external sources of control.
2.

Attribution of Causality
Storms and Nisbett (1970) gave insomniacs

placebos and told one group that it would produce alertness and the other group that it would produce relaxation.
The former group attributed their wakefulness to the placebo,
thus were able to sleep better.
Valins

(1966) and Davison and Valins (1969)

have demonstrated that individuals can be deceived into
falsely attributing causation to themselves. 5
3.

Locus-of-Control and Reaction to Aversive Stimuli
Seligman,Maie r, and Solomon (1971) and Averill

(1973), among others, concluded that perceived control over
impending harm tends to reduce the noxiousness of the
event (i.e., reduces the effect due to the situation).
Perceived control has been defined in many ways.

Common

operationalizations have included the ability to avoid
shock or predict the onset of aversive stimuli.
4.

Individual Differences in Locus-of-Control
As noted by Reid (1977) , although the studies

cited above demonstrated that locus-of-control af fects

5. For further exploration of research on attribution of causation, please refer to Jones, Kanouse,
Nisbett, Valins and Weiner (1972) .
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behavior, they did not examine for individual differences.
In other words some individuals may have a greater
tendency to believe they have an internal locus-of-control
over their outcomes than others who more readily attribute causation to external determinants.
The first step towards assessing the effect
of internal versus external locus-of-control on behavior,
was to construct a measure of locus-of-control.

The

most widely used measure is a scale that was introduced
by Rotter (1966) •

The Rotter I-E Scale evolved out of

early work by Phares (1957), but the present version of
the scale consists of twenty three forced-choice I-E
items, along with six filler items to help disguise
the nature of the test.

Please refer to Appendix 1.

According to London and Exner (1978) , out
of the original pool of items those which contributed
to lack of acceptable internal consistency or that
contained alternatives endorsed more than 85% of the
time were eliminated.

In addition, only those items

that did not show substantial correlations with social
desirability measures were retained.
Rotter (1966) reported that depending on
the time period and particular population, test-retest
reliability of the scale ranged from .49 to .83.

Similar
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results were reported by Hersch and Scheibe (1967).
Evidence of construct validity for the scale
has involved a variety of research regarding its
behavioral correlates.

Seeman and Evans (1962) found

that endorsement of internal alternatives was related to
information seeking.

Much of the research on information

seeking has been done with college populations.

This

raises some questions about the appropriateness of this
behavior for construct validation.

The fact that people

pursue college suggests that they are information seeking.
However, there is still a population

~f

students who are

more external as measured by the scale.
Crowne and Liverant

(1963) found that internals

are better able to resist group pressures.

Tolor

(1971)

noted that externals were more likely to acquiesce.
Similarly, Biondo and MacDonald (1971) found conformity
in externals and resistance by internals to high influence.
Research on verbal conditioning supports the
conclusion that internals are less susceptible to social
influence than are externals.

Getter (1966) found that

those who conditioned well tended to be external, and
Doctor (1971) found that internals display greater
resistance to subtle influence and externals display
greater compliance and responsivity.

More recently,
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Alegre and Murray (1974) concluded that verbal conditioning
is greatest in externals, less in midrange subjects, and
least in internals.

Furthermore, externals tended to

cooperate with the experimental demands of the situation.
As stated above, one goal of the present study
is to provide further validation of the Rotter I-E scale.
Thus, it is hypothesized that individuals who report
a more internal locus-of-control will tend to have
their behavior more determined by internal, relatively
permanent, characteristics (i.e., significantly greater
variance in behavior due to the person rather than the
situation).

Conversely, individuals who report more

external locus-of-control will tend to have their behavior
more determined by external factors

(i.e., significantly

greater variance in behavior due to the situation rather
than the person) .
A second goal of the present study is to
advance the theoretical model of interactionism.

Pre-

sumably, individual differences in the tendency to have
behavior determined by persons and situations, could
account for the meager percentages of variance found
in studies reviewed by Bowers (1973).

Please refer

to Table 4.
Having operationalized locus-of-control in
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terms of the Rotter I-E scale, it is important to define
the person and situation variables to be utilized.

They

will be anxiety and anagram tasks respectively.

V.

Anxiety as a Person Variable
Lamb (1978) has delineated three major areas of
development in the theory and research on anxiety: 1)
clinical-applied, 2) experimental, and 3) personalityresearch.

Although the emphasis is on the current concep-

tualization and measurement of anxiety in terms of states
and traits, I will first review the historical framework.
A.

Early Theory and Research
Many have cited William James as the first to express

a particular interest in emotional phenomena from a
psychological perspective.

James (1884)

in response to emotional stimuli
or

reflex

ther~

indicated that

are various innate

adjustments of the nervous system which lead

automatically to bodily changes, mostly in skeletal
muscles and the viscera.

He argued that some of these

changes can be felt and that the perception of them is
the emotion.

While taking similar ideas of Lange inbo

account; James (1890) revised his formulations.

In

summary, the James-Lange theory made emotion the result
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and not the cause of the bodily changes.
Although their theory was the impetus for further
advances in the area, Titchener (1914) argued that the
James-Lange theory had its origins in the writings of
the early French philosopher-physiologists, and was
not new.
Lamb (1978) denoted the clinical-applied perspective of anxiety as beginning with orthodox psychoanalytic
theory and culminating in various existential viewpoints.
Freud (1895) proposed that undischarged libido might
be transformed into anxiety (i.e., an unpleasurable
emotional state).

However, he did not explain the

transformation process.
his theory of anxiety.

Later, Freud (1926) changed
He reformulated that when the

psyche is overwhelmed and unable to master or discharge
stimuli originating either internally or externally,
anxiety automatically develops.

Automatic anxiety is

considered characteristic of infancy and the actual
anxiety neuroses.

However, Freud (1926) also hypothesized

that with the development of the ego, the individual
acquires the capacity to produce anxiety when a danger
situation arises or is anticipated.

Signal anxiety is

considered characteristic of normal development and the
psychoneuroses.
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Since Freud, other various theoretical accounts
of anxiety resulting from perceived danger have arisen
out of clinical-applied settings.

Sullivan (1953)

viewed anxiety as a perceived negative evaluation by
significant others.

Goldstein (1939) saw anxiety as a

catastrophic reaction.

Anxiety was also considered

as a threat to the Self concept by Rogers (1951), and
as a threat to existence by May (1950) •
According to Lamb (1978) the first attempts to
study anxiety experimentally were in laboratory settings.
Pavlov (1927) and Mowrer (1939) concept¥alized anxiety
as being classically conditioned.

Dollard and Miller

(1950), Spence and Taylor (1953), and Spence and Spence
(1966) viewed anxiety as a drive state which motivates
the organism to further behavior.
B.

Contemporary Theory and Research
Lamb (1978) indicated that the personality-research

perspective has emphasized the importance of personality
traits, factors that influence stress reactions, and
particular anxiety states.
Cattell and Scheier (1961) were

among the first

to emphasize the importance of distinguiqhing between
state anxiety and trait anxiety.

Cattell (1973) pro-

posed the use of factor-analytic techniques and discussed
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his development of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (i.e., 16 PF) as a method for measuring state
and trait anxiety.
Lamb (1978) cited an unpublished paper by Lazarus
et al. which reviewed some theoretical distinctions
relevant to the analysis of coping and emotion.
refer to Figure 3 for a summary.

Please

The work of Lazarus

and his colleagues has been of contemporary importance.
Lazarus (1966) described stress as a stimulus in terms
of the conditions that produce stress reactions, and as
a response in terms of: 1) reports of disturbed affects,
for example, fear, anxiety, anger; 2) motor behavior
for example, tremors, increased muscular tension, speech
disturbances; 3) changes in adequacy of cognitive functioning, for example, thought interruption, perception
distortions; and 4) physiological changes such as in
heart rate and respiration.
Research exploring the relationship between the
four different types of stress responses has been discrepant.

Spielberger (1966) explained these findings by

citing their lack of distinction between state and trait
anxiety.

Spielberger et al.

(1970) conceptualized state

anxiety as a transitory emotional state or condition of
the human organism that is characterized by subjective,
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consciously perceived feelings of tension and apprehension,
and heightened autonomic nervous system activity.

They

defined trait anxiety as relatively stable individual
difference in anxiety proneness, that is, the difference
between people in a tendency to respond to situations
perceived as threatening with elevations in state anxiety.
Thus, trait anxiety indicates differences in the strength
of a latent disposition to manifest a certain type of
reaction.
Spielberger's (1972) state-trait anxiety theory
is schematically presented in Figure 4, and the assumptions are summarized as follows:

1) State anxiety will

be evoked in situations perceived as threatening; 2) High
state anxiety will be experienced through sensory perceptual
feedback mechanisms as unpleasant; 3) The level of state
anxiety depends on the intensity of the threat as perceived
by the individual; 4) The duration of state anxiety
depends on the persistence of the individual's perception
of the situation as threatening; 5) Situations that involve
threats to self-esteem will be perceived as more threatening by individuals with high trait anxiety, than by those
with low trait anxiety; 6) State anxiety may serve as
a driving force resulting in the stimulation of psychological
defenses which in the past have reduced state anxiety;
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and 7) Individuals may also develop specific coping responses to reduce state anxiety.
C.

Measurement of State and Trait Anxiety
Spielberger et al (1970), developed the State-

Trait Anxiety Inventory 6 by initially taking one hundred
and seventy-seven items, correlating .25 or higher with
each other, from three current anxiety scales.

Then

they rewrote the items in terms of intensity for the
state anxiety scale, and in terms of frequency for the
trait anxiety scale.
Spielberger (1972) described the strategy by
which the state anxiety scale was refined to insure
that mean scores for state anxiety are higher in anxiety
situations and that there is high interitem reliability,
Spielberger et al.

(1970) obtained measures in different

stressful situations for eight hundred and sixty-two
subjects.

Results emphasized that state anxiety fluctuates

according to the stressful situation and varies as a
function of the amount of assumed stress.

Lamb (1978)

has reviewed the literature and notes that these general
findings using the state anxiety scale have been replicated
several times with different kinds of stressors.

6.

Please refer to Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.
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Evidence of concurrent validity of the trait anxiety
scale was reported by Spielberger et al.

(1970) in which

a number of studies found positive correlations with other
standard trait anxiety measures such as: 1) the !PAT
anxiety scale; 2) the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale;
and 3) the Zuckerman Affect Adjective Checklist.

Auerbach

(1973), Johnson (1968), Lamb (1973), and Spielberger et
al.

(1970) have all provided evidence for the stability

of measures on the trait anxiety scale across different
experimental situations.
Spence and Spence (1966), Denny (1966), and Hodges
(1968) found relationships between higher levels of trait
anxiety and greater state anxiety reactivity under conditions of ego threat.
D.

Relationship of Anxiety and Locus-of-Control
Research exploring the relationship between external

locus-of-control and anxiety has been numerous.

Archer

(1979) made an extensive review of the literature under
the categories: 1) Studies of locus-of-control and
trait anxiety, see Table 6; 2) Studies of locus-of-control
and situation specific measures of trait anxiety, see
Table 7; and 3) Studies of locus-of-control and state
anxiety, see Table 8.

Archer's (1979) review supports
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the conclusion that greater externality is related to:
1) higher levels of trait anxiety; 2) some situation
specific measures of trait anxiety, such as trait test
anxiety; and 3) state anxiety reactivity, depending
also on the situational context.

VI. Anagrams As A Situa.t idn: variable
Vinache (1974) indicated that perhaps anagrams
have received considerable attention because of their
possible significance for understanding verbal learning.
In an anagram situation, subjects are presented with
scrambled letters (e.g., TCA) and asked to rearrange
the letters to form words (e.g., CAT).

Various factors

have been shown to effect the difficulty of anagram
problem solving situations.
With respect to letter order, Mayzner and Tresselt
(1958) found that the more displacement from the original
words, the more difficult the problem.

Transition proba-

bility (i.e., the frequency with which one letter follows
another infue language) has been shown to effect task
difficulty by Hunter (1961), Harris and Loess (1968),
and Mayzner and Tresselt (1959).

The significance of

word perseveration has been demonstrated by Beilin and
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Horn (1962), and Ekstrand and Dominowski (1968).

Thus,

anagrams as meaningful words are harder than nonsense
forms

(e.g., FROTH is harder than ROFTH for the solution

FORTH).
Cohen (1968) found that words containing letters
of low frequency are easier because of the "rule-out"
factor.

According to Kaplan and Carvellas (1968), the

length of words is related to task difficulty in a nonlinear fashion.

At very great lengths, fewer solutions

are available and the probability of familar suffixes
increases.

Dominowski (1968) has also noted that infor-

mation is another factor (e.g., supplying a correctly
placed letter or sequence reduces the difficulty of the
situation) •
Mayzner and Tresselt (1958), and Dominowski (1967)
presented evidence that high-frequency solution words
are easier than low-frequency words.

Thus, Mermelstein

(1979) utilized fairly easy and extremely obscure words
to vary the difficulty of anagrams.

Please refer to

Appendix 4 and Appendix 5.

VII.

Hypotheses of the Experiment
The research cited above presents a number of
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findings.

Spence and Spence (1966), Deny (1966), and

Hodges (1968) found a relationship between trait anxiety
and state anxiety.

Thus, in the presently proposed

experiment, trait anxiety is expected to account for
some of the variance in state anxiety .
Spielberger et al.

(1970) discovered that state

anxiety fluctuates according to stressful situations
and varies as a function of assumed stress.

This would

suggest that in the present study, the dissimilarity
of the two situations will account for some of the
variance in state anxiety.
After reviewing the literature, Archer (1979)
concluded that locus-of-control is related to state
anxiety.

Hence, I also expect measures on the I-E scale

to account for some of the variance in state anxiety.
According to research reviewed by Bowers (1973),
behavior across dissimilar situations tends to be determined not only by main effects of person and situational
variables, but also by their interaction.

Some of these

studies have shown both main and interaction effects of
trait anxiety and situational variables in determining
state anxiety.

I suspect these general findings will

be substantiated with the presently proposed experiment,
with trait anxiety and locus-of-control each interacting
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with the situation in accounting for variance in state
anxiety.
Finally, the major impetus for this original
study (i.e., which predicts an interaction between locusof-control, trait anxiety, and situational context in
accounting for variance in state anxiety) is to go beyond
the simple replication of previous findings and to understand and lawfully explain the predicted three-way
interaction.

Hence, it is presently hypothesized that:

1) Participants who score high on internality will tend
to have their level of state anxiety more determined
by internal characteristics (i.e., more variance due
to trait anxiety); and 2) Participants who score high
on externality will tend to have their level of state
anxiety more determined by external factors (i.e., more
variance due to the situation).
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Method

I.

Subjects
The participants were 58 volunteers from three
undergraduate psychology courses of Pace University.
The mean age was twenty-two years old; the minimum was
seventeen and the maximum was forty-one.

Forty percent

of the subjects were male; sixty percent were female.
There was a 9:1 ratio of

single to married individuals.

Seventy percent of the group were Caucasian, and
thirty percent were non-Caucasian.

None of the

subjects reported that they discovered the purpose
of the experiement.

II.

Materials
A research consent form which explained that
participation in the study was not a requirement of
their course was given first to each subject.
The following paper and pencil inventories were
administered to all subjects:

1) Rotter Internal-

External Locus-of-Control Scale (I-E scale), Appendix 1;
2) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), Appendix 2
and Appendix 3; 3) a 15-word easy anagrams task, Appendix 4;
4) a 16-word difficult anagrams task, Appendix 5; and 5)
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a brief questionnaire eliciting biographical data,
Appendix 6.
Appendix 4 is composed of words that are fairly
easy to unscramble:

within, wanted, number, police,

revolt, person, damage, change, effect, middle, manage,
moment, arrive, during, and your.

Appendix 5 includes

seven easy words and nine extremely obscure words:
suslik, number, effect, turnix, moment, during, person,
change, frore, tautog, tedder, manage, hanlul, cerium,
bhang, and clomb.

III.

Procedures
A repeated measures design was utilized.

All

participants were informed about the research project
prior to the day of administration.

Those students

who chose to participate were tested in one of three
groups of approximately equal size.

Although the actual

rooms were different, they were similar to the extent
that they were classrooms.
were identical.

Otherwise, the procedures

Each person was given a document of

informed consent to sign.

This was read aloud to the

group as a whole, and the optional nature of participation and confidentiality of any data obtained were
emphasized.
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The research instruments were administered by
the experimenter.

They were presented to the subjects

following a standard format.
The instructions for the I-E scale were as follows:
"In front of you are twenty-nine pairs of statements..
You are to first read statements (a) and (b) for each
item, and then circle the letter of the statement which
most represents your viewpoint."

Then the 15-word

easy anagram task and State Anxiety Inventory were
administered with the following instructions:
are 15 sets of scrambled letters.
the letters to form words.
on to the next test.

"Here

You are to rearrange

When you are finished, go

There are twenty statements which

you are to rate with respect to how you feel at that
moment."
Upon completion the subjects were asked to unscramble 16 more sets of letters and then rate how they
felt afterwards.

Twenty-five minutes later, while the

subjects were still working on the anagram task, the
experimenter asked them to start rating how they felt.
This was followed by the Trait Anxiety Inventory
in which the subjects were asked to rate how they generally
felt.

Finally, they were asked to complete the Bio-

graphical Questionnaire.
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After all participants were tested, they were
debriefed and told the actual purpose of the study.
They were free to ask questions of the experimenter
and were told that they would be informed of the results
of the study if they wished.
A repeated measures analysis of variance was
computed.

According to Winer (1971) it utilizes a

least squares solution, adjusting for intercorrelations
among the independent variables on the between subjects
side of the partitioned variance.

Cohen and Cohen

(1975) indicated that repeated measures ANOVA is the
mathematical equivalent of multiple regression analysis.
More specifically, for this study Davidson and Toporek's
(1981) P4V program was utilized to control for the
relationship between locus-of-control and trait anxiety.
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Results

The internal consistency coefficients for the
I-E scale are presented in Table 9.

According to

Nunnally (1967), Cronbach's Alpha is approximately
equal to the average intercorrelation of items and is
represented by

L~1BDA

3

=

0.71523.

Guttman (1945)

has supported the practice of utilizing the largest
reliability coefficient, which in this study is LAMBDA
6

=

0.82163.
Frequencies and other descriptive statistics

for purposes of dichotomizing internal from external
subjects are presented in Table 10.

The mean, mode

and median are approximately equal, and thus, the
most natural place to split the subject pool into two
categories.

Similar data are presented in Table 11

for trait anxiety scores.
is not as even.

However, the distribution

Because the mean is pulled away from

the center in a skewed distribution, the median is the
best measure of central tendency, thus, the best place
to dichotomize low trait anxiety from high trait anxiety
subjects.
Figure 5 graphically displays the results of a
repeated measures analysis of variance.

For internal
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subjects, the significant interaction effect of trait
anxiety and anagram tasks seems clear.
is seen for external subjects.
to anagram tasks is apparent.

No interaction

However, the effect due
Thus, as the difficulty

of the anagram tasks increases so does the state anxiety
of external subjects.
The results of the repeated measures analysis
of variance are also illustrated in Table 12.

As can

be seen, trait anxiety adjusting for locus-of-control,
and anagram tasks had significant effects on state
anxiety.

The following interactions also had a signifi-

cant effect on state anxiety and are presented in Table
12:

1) locus-of-control by trait anxiety; 2) anagram

tasks by trait anxiety adjusting for locus-of-control;
and 3) anagram tasks by locus-of-control by trait anxiety.
Given these results, further tests were conducted
within levels of locus-of-control.

The data for internal

and external subjects are shown in Table 13 and Table 14
respectively.

The former shows that internal subjects'

state anxiety is significantly related both to trait
anxiety and anagram tasks, and to their interaction.
Table 13 also illustrates that the effect of trait anxiety
is significant for internal subjects within both easy
and difficult anagram tasks.

Table 14 indicates that

external subjects' state anxiety is only related to the
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effect of anagram tasks.

The effect of trait anxiety

and the interaction of trait anxiety and anagram tasks
are not significant for external subjects.
More subjectively, upon inspection of the participants' responses, it seems as though they tended to
respond seriously to the scales.

No other distractions

or factors which could add unsystematic error to the
results were apparent.
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Discussion

Prior to exploring the implications of this
study, it is appropriate to review how the method handled
possible threats to validity.

Then more information

about the actual meaning of the results will be detailed.
Finally, a number of conclusions and inferences will be
discussed concerning the reliability and validity of
the I-E scale, in particular, and the promise it holds
for understanding the determinants of behavior, in
general.

Within the discussion of these issues, impli-

cations for future research and clinical practice will
also be outlined.
The major criticism of a repeated measures design
is the possibility of an order effect.

If the purpose

of the experiment were to measure the change in anxiety
produced by different levels of anagram difficulty, a
repeated measures design would be inappropriate because
of the possibility of a priming effect.

I have not

focused on which aspects of the situation affect anxiety.
I made no claim that the only factor involved was a
quantitative change in the frequency of the anagram
words.

For my purposes, it was only necessary to measure

state anxiety in two dissimilar situations.

The situations
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were defined bythe anagram tasks and the entire context
in which they appeared, which included the order.
Auerbach (1973), Johnson (1968), Lamb (1973),
and Spielberger et al.

(1970) have all provided evidence

for the stability of measures on the trait anxiety
scale across different experimental situations.

Thus,

the possibility of a priming affect on responses to the
Trait Anxiety Inventory was not seen as significant
nor a threat to validity.
Another possible criticism, is the lack of independence between the locus-of-control and trait anxiety
constructs.

Archer (1979) has concluded that greater

externality is related to higher levels of trait anxiety.
A review of research in the area is presented in Table 6.
However, by utilizing a repeated measures analysis of
variance, the data analysis controlled for this relationship.

As cited above, Winer (1971) indicated that a

repeated measures analysis of variance uses a least
squares solution, adjusting for intercorrelations among
the independent variables on the between subjects side
of the partitioned variance.
As a result of this procedure, the column marginals
in Tables 13 and 14 are not the strict mathematical
average of state anxiety means for low and high trait
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anxiety (i.e., they are not the average of the columns).
Instead, they are adjusted slightly in order to control
for the small relationship between locus-of-control
and trait anxiety.
The I-E scale coefficients presented in Table 9,
ranging from .68 to .82, are congruent with earlier
findings by Rotter (1966), which ranged from .49 to .83,
and support the conclusion that the scale is internally
consistent.
The results presented in Table 12 are consistent
with previous research reviewed by Bowers (1973) and
summarized in Table 4.

Thus, in the present study,

24.22% of the variance was explained by person and situation variables.

The remainder was error variance.

Earlier studies, cited above and generated from
an analysis at the reaction level, have been utilized
to support the locus-of-control construct at the mediational level.

Hence, locus-of-control has been related

to the degree of actual susceptibility to situational
influence.

The findings in Tables 13 and 14 are mostly

in agreement with this.

However, Rotter (1966) depicted

externality as an individual's perception that outcome
is only partially contingent or totally non-contingent
upon his action or relatively permanent internal characteristics.

Conversely, if a person perceives outcome
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as contingent upon his own behavior or characteristics,
it is termed as a belief in internal control.

Theoretical

discrepancies arise from this issue of perceived partial
contingencies.

If a person believes he can affect the

probability of an outcome but is not the sole determinant,
Rotter (1966) would call him external.
The results in Tables 13 and 14 are in direct
conflict with Rotter's original hypothetical construct.
He would predict that the behavior of internal subjects
is due solely to internal characteristics, and that the
behavior of external subjects is due to external factors
possibly in interaction with internal characteristics.
The results for internal subjects presented in Table 13,
show highly significant F tests for trait anxiety, anagram
tasks, and their interaction.

Additionally, the results

for external subjects, presented in Table 14, show only
a significant F for anagram tasks.
Accornw~dating

the construct at the mediational

level in order to account for these results at the
reaction level seems most pragmatic.
a modification is called for.

From hence forth

Internality can still

be construed as the belief that one's actions or internal
characteristics affect outcome, yet this is no longer
to be viewed as a.t the exclusion of situational factors.
Thus, externality is to be construed as the belief that
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outcome is not significantly contingent upon oneself,
but due solely to situational factors.
The results of the present study also call for a
reconceptualization of the popular interactionist perspective. The shift away from traditional trait and situationist models may not be totally justified.

The

present study shows that for a specific sub-population
(i.e., external subjects), the situationist model is
the most pragmatic for specifying the determinants of
th-eir behavior.
Of course, this does not necessitate the acceptance of the situationist position in its entirety as an
explanatory model for external individuals.

It is

conceivable that with respect to ontogenetics, individuals
with external I-E scores developed their externality
according to the principles of an interactionist model.
Thus, a social learning process may occur that emphasizes
organismic differences and the way a person selects and
influences the situations he interacts with.

However,

once an external locus-of-control is fully established,
future development falls outside of the individual's
control and is only affected by error and situational
factors.
The interactionist model appears to be the most
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useful for specifying the ontogenetics and determinants
of behavior for internal individuals.

As depicted

above, interactionism holds some similarity to the more
complex psychodynamic model.

The traditional trait

model alone, seems of little utility.
Clinically, this line of research suggests some
considerations · concerning intervention.

Thus, for

example, it may be necessary to train external individuals
to manage environmental stress before any internally
oriented anxiety management interventions could have
an impact.
Future research must focus on the appropriateness
of generalizing from measures of anxiety and changes in
anagram tasks, to global statements about person and
situational variables respectively.

Replication of this

experiment utilizing different internal characteristics
which can be measured both as a trait, and as a state
under changing situations, seems to be the next step.
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Endler and Hagnusson (1976)

1

7. Type of laws sought

6. Units of analysis

focused on
a. Age groups
b. Normal-abnormal
5. Consistency-specificity
issue

4. Populations primarily

Dynamics (underlying
motives and instincts;
traits)
R-R and S-R

a. Adults and children
b. Abnormal
Consistency of behavior
across situations

R-R

Traits

a. Adults
b. Both
Consistency of behavior
across situations

a. Questionnaires, ratings,
tests
b. Questionnaire scores,
test scores, rating
scores
c. Correlation, factor
analysis

a. Interviews, case
histories
b. Verbal descriptions

c. Interpretation of
verbal descriptions

a. No
b. Nativism
c . Biological

a. Yes
b. Both
c. Both

c. Treatment of data

Inner directed

Inner directed

1. Actual behavior determinants
2. Development
a . Interest in development
b. Nativism-empiricism
c. Biological-psychological
emphasis
3. Research strategy (measurement and treatment of data)
a. Methods of data
collection
b. Type of data

Situationism

c. Analysis of variance, factor
analysis, patterns of correlations, Markov chains

a. Observations, tests,
questionnaires, experiments
b. Test scores, questionnaire
scores, experimental data

a. Yes
b. Empiricism
c. Both

Inner-outer directed

Interactionism

S-R

0'\

...,.]

S-R-S-R-S-R ••••.••••••••••••••••

a. Adults and children
a. Adults and children
b. Normal
b. Normal
Inconsistency of behavior Person-situation interactionsand
across situations
other interactions; Behavior
(specificity)
varies across situations and
subjects
Situations
Person-situation interactions
and other interactions

c. Analysis of variance

b. Experimental data
frequency counts

a. Experiments

a. Yes
b. Empiricism
c. Psychological

Outer directed

Models

Psychodynamic

Parameters of comparison
Trait

A Schematic Comparison of Four Personality Theories

Source:

TABLE

X

X

X

Physiological reactions

Artificial behavior

X

X

Standardized
test methods
(T data)

Method of data collection
Self-report
(S data)

X

X

Ratings
(R data)

Covert reactions

Overt behavior

Reaction
Variable

Magnusson and Endler (1977)

2

Classification of Method of Data Collection and Type of Reaction Variable

Source:

TABLE

X

X

X

Objective
measures
(0 data)

N
"-.J

Magnusson and Endler (1977)

Absolute
consistency

Relative
consistency

Degree of
Consistency

Similar behavior

D

B

Similar behavior

Stable rank orders

c

A

Stable rank orders

'Dissimilar

Similar

Situations

Absolute and Relative Consistency Across Similar and Dissimilar Situations

Source:

TABLE _3

co

-...]

Bowers (1973)

4

13.02
11.16
9.14
9.31
b
40.2
18.14

8.48
9.93
7.68
19.12
16.20
4.44
4.56
20.70a
16.1
9.66

.25
3.08
6.20
5.23
7.18
3.95
7.78
14.15
43.6
16.11

Scores represent aver. of 4 ways to treat data. The authors applied both a random and fixed effects analysis of variance to findings that were
scored as both interval and dichotomous data. For person effects, the four different results were 14.7%, 18.1%, 26.4%, and 23.6%. For setting
effects the results were 14.3%, 15.5%, 12.9%, and 13.9%.

Since each S was observed only once in each situation, there was no error term for the interaction variance.

b.

30.51
32.27
9.97

2.22
2.42
3.29
29.96
6.78
17.63
17.34
23.01
21.98

2.50
7.31
7.30
1. 70
12.56
3.64
7.63
19.79
23.31

11.30
21.22
22.41
16.95
25.41
23.33
22.31
29.21
28.01

Percentage of
Variance due to:
Setting
Person
PXS
(S)
(P)

a.

* Raush, Dittman, & Taylor (1959) Ss • 6 hyperaggressive boys across 6 settings (aver. across 2 sets of observations).
* Raush, Farbman, & Llewellyn (1960) Ss • 6 normal control Ss matched with above Ss at age of first observation.
Ss • 6 normal control Ss matched with above Ss at second observation.
*Moos (1968) Ss • 30 psychiatric patients across nine settings (data aver. across 5 different factors).
Ss • 10 professional staff across 9 settings (data aver. across 5 different factors).
* Moos (1969) Ss • 16 psychiatric patients across 6 settings using self-report ratings on 2 occasions 3 months apart.
Data are aver. across 9 rating scales.
Ss ~ same 16, 6 settings, 2 occasions employing observer enumerations of S behavior. Data aver. across 8 behavior
categories.
* Moos (1970) Ss • 12 psychiatric patients across 6 settings using change scores from earlier to later assessments on
S rating scales. Data aver. across 8 dimensions.
Ss • same as above etc. but data aver. across 7 behavior categories.
* Endler & Hunt (1966) Ss • 289 students on S-R Inventory of Anxiousness. Data aver. across 3 university samples
* Endler & Hunt (1968) Ss • 264 men aver. across alternative forms of the S-R Hostility Inventory and across 4 university
samples.
Ss • 236 women aver. across alternate forms of S-R Hostility Inventory and across 4 university samples.
* Endler & Hunt (1969) Median % variance across 22 samples of men on S-R Inventory of Anxiousness.
Median % variance, across 21 samples of women on S-R Inventory of Anxiousness.
*Nelson, Grinder, & Mutterner (1969) Ss • 47 boys/59 girls aver. • 11.8 yrs. old across 6 temptation situations.
* Argyle & Little (1972) Ss • 23 polytech. students rating own behavior vis-a-vis 12 target persons. Data aver. over 18
bipolar constructs.
* Endler (1973) Ss m 308 normal and abnormal persons responding to an S-R Inventory of General Trait Anxiousness.

Study

Summary of Studies that Utilized the Analysis of Variance to Determine the Percentage of Variance Accounted
fo~ by the Situation, Persons and the Situation byPerson Interaction

So~rce:

TABLE

-...,J

1.0

80
TABLE
. Source:
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Mischel (1973)

Summary of Cognitive Social Learning Person Variables

1.

Construction competencies: ability to construct
(generate) particular cognitions and behaviors.
Related to measures of I.Q., social and cognitive
(mental) maturity and competence, ego development,
social-intellectual achievements and skills.
Refers to what the subject knows and can do.

2.

Encoding strategies and personal constructs:
units for categorizing events and for selfdescriptions.

3.

Behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome expectancies in particular situations.

4.

Subjective stimulus values: motivating and
arousing stimuli, incentives and adversions.

5.

Self-regulatory systems and plans: rules and
self-reactions for performance and for the
organization of complex behavior sequences.

Archer (1979)
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College students
College students (N1)
College students (Nz)
"Low achieving" college students
Male vocational rehab. clients
College students
Teachers & teachers' aides
College students

Obese female adolescents
Emotionally disturbed child
College students

Alcoholics
Elementary school children
College students
Alcoholics
Army recruits
College students
College students

Platt & Eisenmann (1968)
Ray & Katahn (1968)

Hountras & Scharf (1970)
Tseng (1970)
Johnson (1972)
Powell & Vega (1972)a
Jolly & Spielberger (1973)

Snow & Held (1973)
Finch & Nelson (1974)a
Gough (1974)

O'Leary, Donovan & Hagve (1974)
Shriberg (1974)8
Archer & Stein (1975, Note I)
Donovan, Smyth, Paige & O'Leary (1975)
Naditch, Gargan & Michael (1975)
Jacobs (1976)
Deardorff, Kendall, Finch & Sitarz (1977)

n

114m, f
111m,f
213m,f
142m
506f
32m,f
323m,f
303m,f
60m
70m,f
m,f
44f
245m
309f
23F
SOm,f
141m
220f
52m
671m,f
247m,f
60m
547m
200m,f
59m,f

SA locus of control measure ' other than Rotter's I-E Scale was employed in this study.
bExact values were not reported for this relationship.
* • p .OS.
** - p .01.
*** - p .001.
N.S. • Not Significant

Population
High school students
College students
College smokers
College students

Study
Efran (1963)(see Rotter, 1966)
Ware (1964)(see Rotter, 1966)
Lichtenstein & Keutzer (1967)
Watson (1967)

TMAS
Children's General Anxiety scale
STAI A-trait
TMAS
!PAT A scale
!PAT A scale
STAI A-trait

CPI Anxiety

CMAS

Welsh A scale

STAI A-trait
TMAS
STAI A-trait

CMAS

Cornell Index Anxiety Scale
TMAS
TMAS
TMAS (Heineman Form)

Anxiety Measure
TMAS (Short Form)
TMAS
!PAT A Scale
TMAS

Studies of Locus of Control and Trait Anxiety

Source:

TABLE

.40*
.36
.26**
.22**
.38*
.23***
.30**
.34*
.31**
.48**
.36**

r, F or t
.00
.24*
.41*
.35**
.38**
t•1.91*
.40**
.30**
F"'6.40**
F(pos)N.S.
F*(pos) b .
.27*
.35**

00

1--'

Population

College students
College students (N1)
College students (N2)
College students
Elementary school children
College students
College students
College students
"College age" subjects

Gold (1968)

Ray & Katahn (1968)

n
47m,f
106m
153m
46f
31m
53f
142m
506f
36m
68f
323m,f
303m,f
87m,f
671m,f
102f
79m,f
66f
300m,f

p

.os .

** - p .01.
*** a p .001.
N.S. • Not Significant

*-

aA locus of control measure other than Rotter's I-E Scale was employed in this study.
bExact values were not reported for this relationship.

Procicuk & Breen (1973)
Shriberg (1974)a
Brett & Kernaleguen (1975)
Tolor & Reznikoff (1967)
Dickstein (1972)
Berman & Hays (1973)

College students

College students (N2)

College students
U.S. Air Force recruits
College students (N1)

Watson (196 7)

Butterfield (1964)a
Liberty, Burnstein & Moulton (1966)
Feather (1967)

Study

Archer (1979)
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TAQ
TAQ
TAS
TAS
AAT
TAS-C
AAT
Death Anxiety
Death Concern
Fear of Death
Death Anxiety

AAT
TAQ
TAQ
TAQ
AAT
AAT
AAT

Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale

Anxiety Measure

Studies of Locus of Control and Situation Specific Measures of Trait Anxiety

Source:

TABLE

.23
.44*
. 36*
.13
.38*
.07
.25**
. 26**
.02
.12
.22**
.21**
.12
. 25***
.38***
.23*
F=l. 20
r, N.s.b
r, N.s.b

r, F or t

00
N

College students
College students
College students
College students
Emotionally disturbed children
College students
Preoperative surgical patients
College students
College students
College students

Population

aA locus of control measure other than the I-E Scale was employed in this study.
bExact values were not reported for this relationship.
* = p .05.
** ~ p .01.
*** = p .001
N.S. = Not Significant

Phares, Ritchie & Davis (1968)
Miller (1970)
Nelson & Phares (1971)
Houston (1972)
Finch & Nelson (1974)a
Archer & Stein (1975, Note I)
Lowery, Jacobsen & Keane (1975)
Manuck, Hinrichsen & Ross (1975)
Deardorff, Kendall, Finch & Sitarz (1977)
Archer & Stein (1978)

Study

Archer (1979)

8

40m,f
80m,f
42f
66m
50m,f
247m,f ·
91m,f
129m,f
59m,f
80m

n

Studies of Locus of Control and State Anxiety Measures

Source:

TABLE

Self-ratings
Self-ratings
Self-ratings
AACL Today
STAI-C A-State
STAI A-State
AACL Today
STAI A-State
STAI A-State
STAI A-State

Anxiet;)!: Measure

F,N.S.b
F,N.s.b
t=4.00**
F=1.28
.18
.34**
F=8.28*
t=2.49*
.14
F=.50

r, F or t

co
w
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TABLE 9
Internal Consistency of the I-E Scale

LAMBDA 1

=

0.68414

LAMBDA 2

=

0.73670

LAMBDA 3

=

0.71523

LAMBDA 4

=

0.67149

LAMBDA 5

=

0.71299

LAMBDA 6

=

0.82163

CRONBACH'S ALPHA COEFFICIENT= 0.71523
GUTTMAN'S ALPHA COEFFICIENT

= 0.82163
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TABLE 10
Frequences on I-E Scale for Purposes of Dichotomizing
Internal from External Subjects

I-E Scale
Scores

Frequency

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
46.
Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
Minimum
Valid cases

1
1
1
3
5
2
4
5
7
5
4
5
5
4
2
2
1
1
35.655
35.000
-0.281
27.000
58

Relative
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2
2
2
5
9
3
7
9
12
9
7
9
9
7
3
3
2
2

2
3
5
10
19
22
29
38
50
59
66
74
83
90
93
97
98
100

Standard Error
0.527
Standard Deviation 4.016
Skewness
0.077
Maximum
46.000
Missing cases

0

Median
35.500
Variance 16.125
Range
19.000
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TABLE 11
Frequencies on Trait Anxiety for Purposes of Dichotomizing
High Trait Anxiety from Low Trait Anxiety Subjects

Trait Anxiety
Score

Frequency

20.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
42.
43.
44.
45.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
57.

1
2
3
1
3
1
1
6
2
2
1
2
4
2
4
3
1
2
4
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2

Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
Minimum
Valid cases

39.483
33.000
-0.620
20.000
58

Relative
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2
3
5
2
5
2
2
10
3
3
2
3
7
3
7
5
2
3
7
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
3

2
5
10
12
17
19
21
31
34
38
40
43
50
53
60
66
67
71
78
79
81
84
86
88
90
91
93
97
100

Standard Error
1.150
Standard Deviation 8.760
Skewness
0.252
Maximum
57.000
Missing cases

0

Median
38.500
Variance 76.745
Range
37.000

N.S.

=

LOC
Trait Anxiety
Trait Anxiety
LOC
LOC by

Not Significant

Anagram Task
Anagram Task by
Adjusting for
Anagram Task by
Adjusting for
Anagram Task by
Trait Anxiety
Error

Effect

LOC Adjusting for Trait Anxiety
Trait Anxiety Adjusting for LOC
LOC by Trait Anxiety
Error

Effect

ss

94.5376
1204.2229

124.453

6.41045

661.457

Within

29.6117
1066.61
1092.59
8414.8093

Between SS

5 .. 58

0.29

29.66

F

0.19
6.84
7.01

F

94.5376
4.24
22.300424

124.453

6.41045

661.457

MS

29.6117
1066.61
1092.59
155.82980

MS

1, 54

1, 54

1, 54

1, 54

DF

1' 54
1' 54
1, 54

DF

0.0443

0.0218

0.5941

0.0000

p

0.6646
0.0115
0.0106

p

N.S.

N.S.

0.74%
9.49%

0.98%

0.05%

5.21%

% of Variance

0.23%
8.40%
8.61%
66.29%

% of Variance

Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance: The Effect of Independent Variables on State Anxiety

TABLE 12

00
-..J
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TABLE 13
Internal Subjects' Mean State Anxiety Scores Under Four
Possible Combinations of Low and High Trait Anxiety
with Easy and Difficu~t Anagram Tasks

Anagram Task

Row Marginals

Easy

Difficult

Low

33.00

34.29

33.65

High

40.37

48.63

44.50

36.89

41.86

39.38

Trait Anxiety

Column Marginals*

Tests of Main and Interaction Effects on State Anxiety for
Internal Subjects

Effect
Trait Anxiety
Anagram Task
Anagram Task by Trait Anxiety

F

13.56
19.96
9. 77

p

0.00
0.00
0.00

Test of Effect on State Anxiety for Internal Subjects Within
the Easy Anagram Task

Effect
Trait Anxiety

F

5.94

p

0.02

Test of Effect on State Anxiety for Internal Subjects Within
the Diffic~lt Anagram Task

Effect
Trait Anxiety

F

19.18

p

0.00

*The column marginals presented, which average state anxiety
means for low and high trait anxiety, are adjusted for
locus-of-control.
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TABLE 14
External Subjects' Mean State Anxiety Scores Under Four
Possible Combinations of Low and High Trait Anxiety
with Easy and Difficult_Anagram Tasks

Anagram Task

Row Margin als

Easy

Difficult

Low

40.00

44.88

42.44

High

38 . 21

42.43

40.32

38.86

43.32

41.09

Trait Anxiety

Column Marginals*

Test of Effects on State Anxiety for External Subjects

Effect
Trait Anxiety
Anagram Task
Anagram Task by Trait Anxiety

F

0.29
9.79
0.05

p

0.59 N.S.
0.00
0.82 N . S.

*The column marginals presented, which average state anx iety
means for low and high trait anxiety, are adjusted for
locus-of-control.
N.S. = Not Significant
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A

Aggressiveness

B

Aggressiveness
FIGURE 1 The hypothesized relationship between a mediating variable
(aggressiveness) and a reaction variable (aggressive behavior) according to (A) the trait measurement model and (B) the psychodynamic
measurement model
(Source: Magnusson, 1974).
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Q)

.1-J

ctl

.1-J
tf)

Low

Situations

FIGURE 2 The state anxiety profiles for two individuals across six
different situations
(Source: Magnusson and Endler, 1977).

FIGURE

3

Direct actions
Largely motoric modes of
eliminating danger or
achieving gratification

~

For example, avoidance
attack, inaction, active
striving toward goal

l

Dispositional variables
Personality traits, beliefs
cognitive styles, etc.

For example, attention deployment (vigilance or
psychic avoidance), reappraisal (realistic or
defensive), wish-fulfilling
fantasies

Intrapsychic processes
Largely cognitive modes of
conflict resolution

~

Cognitive appraisal
Primary appraisal of threat: secondary
appraisal of coping alternative
reappraisal based on the flow of
events and reflection

Situational variables
Ecological and stimulus
conditions

Some theoretical distinctions relevant to the analysis of coping and emotion.
(Source: Lamb, 1978.)

Specific coping
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Models of
expression
in coping

Psychological
mediators
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conditions
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FIGURE 5
Graph of Internal and External Subjects'
Mean State Anxiety Scores
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High Trait
Anxiety
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~

Ctl

39

Q)

~

38
37
36
35
34
Low Trait
Anxiety

33
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DIFFICULT
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INTERNAL

EASY

DIFFICULT

EXTERNAL

APPENDIX
Source:

Rotter (1966)

Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement

l.a . Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are
too easy with them.
2.a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to
bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3.a . One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't
take enough interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent
them.
4.a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized
no matter how hard he tries.
S.a . The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are
influenced by accidental happenings.
6.a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage
of their opportunities.
7.a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how
to get along with others.

B. a. He redity plays the major role i n determining one's personality.
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.
9.a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a
decision to take a definite course of action.
lO . a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever
such a thing as an unfair test.
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work
that study ing is really useless .
ll.a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or
nothing to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at
the right time.
12.a. The average c i tizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much
the little guy can do abou t it.
13.a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
14.a. There are certain people who are just no good .
b. There is some good in everybody.
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15.a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with
luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping
a coin.
16.a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough
to be in the right place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck
has little or nothing to do with it.
17.a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims
of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people
can control world events.
18.a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are
controlled by accidental happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."
19.a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20.a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.
2l.a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced
by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance,
laziness, or all three.
22 . a. With enough effort we can wipe out p.o litical corruption.
b . It is difficult for people to have much control over the things
politicians do in office.
23.a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades
they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the
grades I get.
24.a . A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they
should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25.a. Many times I fee l that I have little influence over the things
that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays
an important role in my life.
26.a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly .
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they
like you, they like you.
27.a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28.a. What happens to me is my own doing,
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction
my life is taking.
29.a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the
way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on
a national as well as on a local level.

APPENDIX
Source:
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Spielberger et _al (1970)

State Anxiety Questionnaire

1.

I feel calm. . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . . •

1

2

3

4

2.

I feel secure. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

3

4

3.

I am tense....................................... .

1

2

3

4

4.

I am regretful....................................

1

2

3

4

5.

I feel at ease........................... ....... ..

1

2

3

4

6.

I feel upset.... . ....................... . .........

1

2

3

4

7.

I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.

1

2

3

4

8.

I feel rested... . . . ...............................

1

2

3

4

9.

I feel anxious. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

3

4

10.

I feel comfortable................................

1

2

3

4

11.

I feel self-confident .•...........••.....•..•..• . .

1

2

3

4

12.

I feel nervous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . .

1

2

3

4

13.

I am jittery.............. . . . . .... . .. .............

1

2

3

4

14.

I feel "high strung". . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .

1

2

3

4

15.

I am relaxed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . •

1

2

3

4

16.

I feel content............ . ................... ... .

1

2

3

4

17.

I am worried.......................... .. ..........

1

2

3

4

18.

I feel over-excited and "rattled" ..••....•.•••..•.

1

2

3

4

19.

I feel joyful.....................................

1

2

3

4

20.

I feel pleasant •..............•...•..•.......... , •

1

2

3

4
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APPENDIX 3
Source:

Spielberger et al (1970)

Trait Anxiety Questionnaire

1.

I feel pleasant...................................

1

2

3

4

2.

I tire quickly. . • • • • . • . . • . . • . • . • . • . . . . . • . . . . • . • . • •

1

2

3

4

3.

I feel like crying. • • • . . • . • • . • . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . •

1

2

3

4

4.

I wish I could be as happy as others seem
to be........................ . ....................

1

2

3

4

I am losing out on things because I can't
make up my mind soon enough. . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .

1

2

3

4

6.

I feel rested ........•.....•......•........•..•..•

1

2

3

4

7.

I am "calm, cool, and collected"..................

1

2

3

4

8.

I feel that difficulties are piling up so
that I cannot overcome them ......• .. ............. .

1

2

3

4

I worry too much over something that really
doesn't matter....................................

1

2

3

4

10.

I am happy.......... . ......................... . ...

1

2

3

4

11.

I am inclined to take things hard . • .••.•••...•.. • •

1

2

3

4

12.

I lack self-confidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • .

1

2

3

4

13.

I feel secure.....................................

1

2

3

4

14.

I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty ...•..

1

2

3

4

15.

I feel blue .. ·· • .••..••..••••.••.•.....•.....••.. .

1

2

3

4

16.

I am content............................ . .........

1

2

3

4

17.

Some unimportant thought runs through my mind
and bothers me. • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • . • • • • • • •

1

2

3

4

I take disappointments so keenly that I can't
put them out of my mind........................ . ..

1

2

3

4

19.

I am a steady person.. • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • . •

1

2

3

4

20.

I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think
over my recent concerns and interests •••••• • ••••••

1

2

3

4

5.

9.

18.

9Q

APPENDIX 4

Easy Anagram Task
Source: Mermelstein (1979)

w

I T

H

N I

wA

D N E T

u

N ME R

B

p 0 L I E

E

v

c

0 L T R

s

p

D A MA E

G

0 N E R

E N

c

H

A

T E F F E

c

G

.r.i I D D E L

MN E

G

A A

T M 0 M E N

v E

R

D R I

G

A R I
N

u

u

0 R y
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APPENDIX 5

Difficult Anagram Task
Source: Mermelstein (1979)

s

L

B

u N ME

R

T E F F E

c

R

I

K

u s

I N u T X

T M0 ME N
N u D R I

G

0 N E R

s

p

c

H

A

G

E N

R

E 0 F R

G

u T

R

E D T D E

0 A T

MN E

G

A A

Mu I

c

R

E

N u L L A

H

G

A

B L

H B

c

N

0 M
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APPENDIX 6

Biographical Data

Name
Age
Sex
Race
Marital Status

What do you believe the purpose of this experiment is?
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